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ABSTRACT: The California Critical Thinking Dispositions Inventory (CCTDI) is a commonly used tool 
for measuring critical thinking dispositions. However, research on the efficacy of the CCTDI in 
predicting good thinking about students’ own deeply held beliefs is scant. In this paper we report on 
preliminary results from our ongoing study designed to gauge the usefulness of the CCTDI in this 
context.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
The main goal of general critical thinking instruction is the promotion of ‘transfer’: 
improvement in quality of reasoning on topics not dealt with directly in the critical 
thinking class, and in situations other than the critical thinking classroom.  One 
target area for transfer that is commonly discussed in the literature is students’ 
thinking about their own deeply held beliefs. Promoting transfer in this area is 
recognized as particularly difficult both because of the special relationship between 
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the thinker and the object of thought, and because selective application of critical 
thinking skills can improve students’ ability to defend their beliefs from criticism as 
well as attack incongruent beliefs (Paul, 1992, p. 136; 1993, pp. 57-8, 137-8, 206-7, 
329-30).  
One of the keys to the success of a critical thinking intervention is its ability 
to impart the will to think critically, over and above the ability to do so – that is, a 
general disposition to think critically when critical thinking is called for. Once a 
student decides to think critically about a topic, additional more specific critical 
thinking dispositions come into play. The disposition to evaluate one’s own and 
alternative views by the same standards and the disposition to persevere through a 
prolonged or difficult thinking process, amongst others, determine the quality of 
students’ thinking once it has been switched on. Because of the especially 
problematic nature of thinking that is focused on students’ own deeply held beliefs 
and the importance of such beliefs in determining how students behave and interact 
with others in the wider world, the disposition to think about such beliefs critically, 
and attendant dispositions that support good thinking, are particularly important 
both to promote and, ipso facto, to measure. 
One of the tools that is most commonly used to measure critical thinking 
dispositions in research is the California Critical Thinking Dispositions Inventory 
(CCTDI). However, research on the efficacy of the CCTDI in predicting good thinking 
about students’ own deeply held beliefs is scant. The main aim of the current study 
is to gauge the usefulness of the CCTDI in measuring the quality of students’ 
thinking about their own deeply held beliefs. This is done through comparison of 
CCTDI results with results from two other measures, the Revised Paranormal Belief 
Scale (RPBS) and a semi-structured interview.  The outcome is important for a 
further study we hope to undertake that will compare alternative methods of 
delivery of the general critical thinking course to see which is most successful in 
promoting the transfer of critical thinking skills to the students’ thinking about their 
own deeply held beliefs.  This future study will require us to measure the quality of 
students’ thinking about these beliefs; hence our interest in determining what is a 
good way to measure it. Should it turn out that in fact the Revised Paranormal Belief 
Scale performs better (as judged against interviews with participants scored for 
strong sense critical thinking by experienced critical thinking teachers) than the 
CCTDI, that will be a useful result for us, since the RPBS is free, quick to administer, 
and can be easily modified, unlike the CCTDI.  
For the purposes of this research, deeply held controversial beliefs will be 
understood as ethical, epistemological, or ontological beliefs that are important to 
the participant and that are controversial in the sense that many educated and 
intelligent people disagree with regard to their truth. Claims like “Jesus is divine,” 
“People who vote for Labour don’t know anything about politics,” and “Eating meat 
is moral” would be examples provided they were sufficiently important to the 
participant. The participant need not be aware of holding such beliefs so long as it 
can be shown that she behaves as if she does. Strong sense critical thinking will be 
understood as critical thinking that is applied to one’s own beliefs as well as it is 
applied to those of one’s “opponents”: it is critical thinking that is not biased in favor 
of one’s own beliefs (Paul, 1993, pp. 137-8). 
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One of our hypotheses is that lack of strong sense critical thinking is 
indicated by the presence of any one strongly or deeply held belief which is 
pseudoscientific or anti-scientific, or which lacks good scientific backing even 
though it is a belief that could reasonably be expected to have such backing if it were 
true.  The RPBS is a rough and ready survey of seven popular kinds of beliefs of this 
sort. We hypothesised that there would be a correlation between highest score on 
the RPBS (indicating a high degree of belief in some statement of this sort) and low 
scores for strong sense critical thinking (as measured by scored interviews).  A 
second hypothesis was that CCTDI results would not correlate so well with strong 
sense critical thinking, because the CCTDI appears to measure test-takers’ opinions 
about their own critical thinking dispositions rather than the dispositions 
themselves, and there is reason to think that judgments about one’s own virtues and 
abilities tend to be more positive than is justified. 
 
2. METHOD 
 
All participants completed an introductory level one-semester course in critical 
thinking between 2010 and 2012 at the University of Waikato, New Zealand. In all, 
fifty seven people chose to participate. Participants were given two movie vouchers 
as compensation for their efforts. Data from all participants was of sufficient quality 
to be included in the analysis.  At this initial stage no demographic data was 
collected. 
Data was collected using two paper and pencil questionnaires and a semi-
structured interview. The first questionnaire given was the Revised Paranormal 
Belief Scale (RPBS, Tobacyk, 2004). This is a standardized measure of degree of 
belief in each of seven kinds of “paranormal” beliefs: Traditional Religious Belief, Psi, 
Witchcraft, Superstition, Spiritualism, Extraordinary Life Forms, and Precognition. It 
is comprised of 26 statements (e.g. statement 7: Astrology is a way to accurately 
predict the future). Participants indicate the strength of their 
agreement/disagreement with each statement on a seven-level Likert-like rating 
scale (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree). Scores for each kind of belief are 
calculated by averaging the scores for three to four related statements. Mean RPBS 
and High RPBS were also calculated, the latter being the highest degree of belief in 
any one of the seven categories scored by each participant. 
After completing the RPBS participants were given thirty minutes to 
complete the California Critical Thinking Dispositions Inventory (CCTDI). This is an 
internationally recognized standardized critical thinking dispositions test. It is 
comprised of 75 statements. Test-takers indicate the strength of their 
agreement/disagreement on a six-level Likert-like rating scale. The questionnaires 
were machine scored by Insight Assessment who own and distribute the CCTDI. 
Insight Assessment reported back to the researchers. Every participant was given a 
score for each of the following characteristics: truth-seeking, open-mindedness, 
inquisitiveness, analyticity, systematicity, confidence in reasoning, and maturity of 
judgment. They were also given a total score said to measure a general disposition 
towards critical thinking. Low CCTDI was also calculated by the researchers. Low 
CCTDI gives each participant’s lowest CCTDI score. CCTDI scores of  forty to fifty are 
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considered to be positive, and scores of fifty to sixty are considered to be high 
(Facione and Facione, 2010, p. 20). 
After taking the CCTDI participants were interviewed by one of the 
researchers. The interview normally took twenty to thirty minutes and was divided 
into three parts, each geared towards answering a different question (interview 
questions one to three). First, participants were asked if the critical thinking course 
had any influence on the quality of their thinking. Second, participants were asked if 
the critical thinking course had any influence on the quality of their thinking about 
their own deeply held but controversial beliefs.  The meaning of “deeply held 
controversial beliefs” was explained to participants briefly in a way that is 
consistent  with but is not necessarily as detailed as the definition given above (see 
introduction). Both these questions were later scored by each of the researchers 
scoring independently on a seven-level Likert-like rating scale (1 = very negative, 7 
= very positive). If a participants’ answer was not sufficiently clear he or she was 
explicitly asked to rate changes on this scale.  
In the third part of the interview participants were asked to discuss one, two, 
or three claims that are likely to be controversial beliefs of importance to the 
participant. The aim was to discuss two claims, but sometimes one provided 
sufficient telling responses, and at other times two claims still failed to elicit enough 
responses; hence the variability in the number of claims. The first claim is typically 
chosen from a belief rated seven in the RPBS, and the second one was typically “it is 
morally okay to eat meat.” Participants were first asked to give the reasoning behind 
their beliefs. They were then confronted with counterarguments given by the 
interviewer, and asked to volunteer their thoughts again. The process was normally 
repeated twice, or three or more times if only one claim was discussed. To help elicit 
the needed data participants were also asked questions like these: 
 
 What are your thoughts about X? 
 
 Why do you think that X is true/false? 
 
 Suppose you met someone who had different beliefs about X, because 
they think that Y or Z. How do you think you might respond to them 
about this issue? 
 
 Has this discussion changed your view about X? 
 
 In the light of this discussion, do you think that in the days and weeks 
following the interview you will think about X further, and perhaps try 
to find out more information about the topic? 
 
Using recordings of the interviews and a rating guide, the behavior of each 
participant was rated on a seven-level Likert-like rating scale for its conformity with 
the following claim: The participant displays strong sense critical thinking about 
his/her own deeply held controversial beliefs (1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly 
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agree). The guide included definitions of strong sense critical thinking, non-critical 
thinking, and weak sense critical thinking, as well as lists of typical behaviors 
indicative of these (see appendix).  (Data from one rater is at the moment of writing 
incomplete, and so is not included in the analysis below.) 
 
3. RESULTS 
 
Scoring of question one and two of the interview by the two raters for whom all the 
data is available (JK and IG) displayed sufficient inter-rater reliability (question one 
r(57) = .826, p = .001, question two r(57) = .815, p = .001). The scoring of question 
three showed considerable correlation (r(57) = .608, p = .001) but not sufficiently 
high for inter-rater reliability, assuming r = .8 as threshold (see table 1). 
Three RPBS items were found to have correlations with SSCT (question three, 
interview). Traditional Religious Belief correlated negatively with SSCT for one rater 
and the mean of both raters (scored by IG, r(57) = - .339, p = .010, mean of IG & JK 
scores, r(57) = - .320, p = .015). Mean RPBS correlated negatively with SSCT for the 
mean of IG & JK scores (r(57) = - .269, p = .043). High RPBS correlated negatively 
with SSCT for both raters and the mean of IG & JK scores (scored by IG, r(57) = - .297, 
p = .025, scored by JK, r(57) = - .298, p = .024, mean of IG & JK scores, r(57) = - .330, 
p = .012, see table 2). 
Several correlations were found between the CCTDI and SSCT (question 
three, interview). Truth-seeking correlated positively with SSCT for JK and the mean 
of IG & JK scores (scored by JK, r(57) = .360, p = .006, mean of IG & JK scores, r(57) 
= .279, p = .035). Open-mindedness correlated positively with SSCT for both raters 
and the mean of IG & JK scores (scored by IG, r(57) = .294, p = .026, scored by JK, 
r(57) = .288, p = .030, mean of IG & JK scores, r(57) = .323, p = .014). Inquisitiveness 
correlated positively with SSCT for one rater and the mean of IG & JK scores (scored 
by JK, r(57) = .501, p = .001, mean of IG & JK scores, r(57) = .445, p = .001). 
Analyticity correlated positively with SSCT for one rater (scored by JK, r(57) = .284, 
p = .032). Confidence in reasoning correlated positively with SSCT  for one rater 
(scored by JK, r(57) = .265, p = .046). Total CCTDI correlated positively with SSCT 
for one rater and the mean of IG & JK scores (scored by JK, r(57) = .446, p = .001, 
mean of IG & JK scores, r(57) = .362, p = .006). Low CCTDI correlated positively with 
SSCT for one rater (scored by JK, r(57) = .328, p = .013, see table 3).  
Numerous positive correlations were also found between the interview items, 
indicating that a higher rating of the positive influence of the CT course on one’s 
thinking in general as well as one’s thinking on one’s own deeply held but 
controversial beliefs predicted higher SSCT scores (see tables 4 and 5). 
CCTDI means are either in the positive range, or in the case of truth-seeking 
and systematicity, very close to it. In comparison, the mean for High RPBS (a 
participant’s most strongly held RPBS category) favours paranormal belief, and the 
means for SSCT are quite low, indicating widespread deficiency in strong sense 
critical thinking (see table 6).  
Means for question one of the interview (improvement in thinking attributed 
by the participant to the critical thinking course) show perception of medium to 
small improvement. Means for question two of the interview (improvement in 
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thinking about one’s own deeply held but controversial beliefs attributed by the 
participant to the critical thinking course) all show perception of small to no 
improvement (see table 7). 
 
4. DISCUSSION 
 
At this stage of the research data from only two interview raters is available. Scores 
for these raters for all three interview questions show strong positive correlations. 
Crucially, however, the correlation coefficient for question three was lower than 0.8. 
It was hoped that question three of the interview would be the most accurate 
measure of participants’ strong sense critical thinking, acting as a standard with 
which to evaluate the suitability of the CCTDI and the RPBS for future research. In 
some cases the scores of the two raters diverge considerably (e.g. one rater scores 
the participant’s behavior as 5, or mostly strong sense critical thinking, while the 
other rater scores a 1, or no strong sense critical thinking). Without speculating on 
the effect of the data from the third rater on this correlation, these divergent cases 
call for qualitative analysis. We hope that such analysis will help us locate the causes 
of our disagreements and suggest changes to our method.  
Still, in most cases scores for SSCT were more or less in line with each other, 
suggesting to us that we are, at the very least, on the right track. Also, until 
qualitative analysis is carried out, it is possible that the divergences are due to one 
rater not following the rating criteria sufficiently well. Because of both of these 
reasons, and because of the preliminary nature of this research, we believe that 
there is still some insight to be gained from comparing results from question three 
of the interview with results from the RPBS and the CCTDI.  
Of the three correlations between RPBS and SSCT (question three, interview), 
only High RPBS correlated negatively with SSCT scores from both raters. One of our 
hypotheses was that any one strongly or deeply held non-scientific, pseudoscientific, 
or anti-scientific belief indicates lack of strong sense critical thinking. The RPBS is a 
rough and ready survey of seven popular kinds of beliefs of this sort. High RPBS  
gives the highest score for each participant, that is, a participant’s highest level of 
belief in any of the seven RPBS items. The modest negative correlations found 
support our hypothesis somewhat.   
Of the CCTDI items that correlated with SSCT (question three, interview) 
most were due to the scoring of a single rater (JK). Only Open-mindedness 
correlated positively for both raters. The number of correlations does suggest that 
the CCTDI has some predictive power with respect to strong sense critical thinking, 
but in absolute terms High RPBS came much closer to the raters’ judgments than 
any CCTDI item. Mean CCTDI scores are by and large positive, while results for SSCT 
are quite poor with many participants displaying very little if any strong sense 
critical thinking behaviors. High RPBS results lie somewhere in between. A look at 
the five top RPBS and CCTDI scorers shows that good results in these instruments 
does not predict a good result in SSCT (see tables 8 and 9). Curiously, the numerous 
positive correlations found between interview items mean that simply asking 
participants if they think the critical thinking course had a good influence on their 
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thinking in general, or their thinking about their own deeply held but controversial 
beliefs in particular, could have as much predictive power for SSCT as the CCTDI.  
Since the researchers also teach the critical thinking course, we are pleased 
with the results of question one of the interview. Whether the students are right in 
thinking that the course has improved their critical thinking skills is a further 
question. Nevertheless, a mean of medium to small improvement in thinking 
attributed by the participants to the course is definitely not bad. Results for question 
two of the interview – a mean of small to no improvement in thinking about one’s 
own deeply held but controversial beliefs attributed by the participant to the course 
– are more in line with results for SSCT. Most of the participants flatly denied 
changing any of their beliefs following the course or applying their newly learned 
skills to their own deeply held beliefs. Several participants who claimed the course 
improved their thinking also made it clear that the improvement was mainly one of 
putting their own arguments more forcefully, of supporting their own previously 
held beliefs with stronger grounds, and of finding out the weaknesses of others’ 
arguments more easily (we hope to report on exact numbers for these once 
qualitative analysis of the interviews is complete). This is in line with our hypothesis 
that the critical thinking course can improve students’ dexterity with certain critical 
thinking skills while at the same time increasing the probability that they will use 
their newly acquired skills one-sidedly, to defend their own previously held beliefs 
and attack the beliefs of others.  
Once data collection and analysis is complete we aim to report on T-tests 
between students who took the course in 2010 or 2011, and students who took the 
course in 2012; correlations between the CCTDI and the RPBS; regression analysis 
and correlations internal to the CCTDI and RPBS; possible changes to the RPBS to 
make it more suitable to our very specific needs; inter-rater reliability and 
correlations with the data from the third interview rater; and likely causes of 
conspicuous divergent results, including divergent SSCT scores.  
With regard to the latter, we are already considering  some hypotheses, 
feedback on which would be most welcome. (1) Is the scoring guide (see appendix) 
sufficiently clear or comprehensive? Some of the “behaviors” listed in the guide are 
not obvious behaviors, and some are not behaviors at all. Nevertheless, they seemed 
to us to embody important differences between strong sense critical thinking and its 
counterfeits, differences that we had to rely on to some extent in our scoring. It was 
hoped that educated guesses based on cues available in more overt behavior would 
suffice for consistent scoring. (2) What effect did the worldviews of the different 
raters have? Can the discrepancies be traced back to different views on the morality 
of eating meat (the most commonly discussed issue in the third part of the 
interviews)? We commonly see students’ judgments about the quality of particular 
instances of reasoning, or the character of other students, being inappropriately 
influenced by prior beliefs. Being teachers of critical thinking does not put us above 
suspicion. (3) Is it our understanding and/or use of the concept of deeply held belief 
that is at fault? One rater (JK) was initially concerned that not all of the topics 
discussed in the interviews were in fact deeply held beliefs of the participants in 
question: this was particularly of concern in cases where the participants didn't 
check 6 or 7 (where 7 is "strongly agree") for any of the items in the RPBS, didn't 
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volunteer any deeply held beliefs when asked to, and responded without much 
enthusiasm to the interviewer's question (having already ascertained that the 
participant was a meat-eater) "Do you strongly feel that it is your right to eat meat?" 
or "Do you strongly feel that meat-eating is morally okay?" If the claims discussed in 
the interview were not deeply held beliefs of the participant, then it would not be 
possible to rate the participant's strong sense critical thinking about their deeply 
held beliefs on the basis of the interview. However, we think that this was not in fact 
a source of difference between raters. In the initial (and currently only) round of 
scoring, JK scored the participants for SSCT on the assumption that the beliefs in 
question were in fact deeply held beliefs, registering her doubts about this 
assumption in some cases for later investigation. The view that deeply held beliefs 
are better revealed by people's practices (e.g. regularly eating meat) than by what 
they say seems defensible, though it is not uncontroversial. We hope to discuss this 
issue further in later work.  
A second issue concerning the notion of deeply held belief is worth 
mentioning here, though it does not explain rating differences in the present data. 
The third rater, whose results are not included in the current data set, suggests that 
religious beliefs may not be suitable examples of deeply held belief in this context; 
since many of the interviews did discuss religious matters, although none of them 
discussed only religious matters, this may, when the data is in, cause there to be a 
difference between TB's ratings for SSCT and those of IG and JK.  The thought is that 
religious and spiritual matters may not be the kinds of things about which people 
can reason with any real effectiveness. They might be considered not to be beliefs at 
all, but rather ways of being. (It is an interesting question whether or not this view is 
opposed to the suggestion in the previous paragraph that one can read people's 
beliefs off their behavior even if they do not admit to having those beliefs when 
questioned).  Or they might be considered to be beliefs which by their very nature 
are held as a matter of faith, rather than reason.  Some of the participants were quite 
explicit about the fact that they were not open to revising their religious beliefs in 
response to argument because they didn't think any arguments could be relevant; 
their belief was a matter of faith.  In contrast, no participants talked like this about 
their beliefs in astrology or in psychic powers. Again, we hope to discuss these 
issues further in subsequent work. 
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APPENDIX: EXCERPTS FROM THE INTERVIEW SCORING GUIDE 
 
Strong sense critical thinking is displayed in behaviors like these: 
 
1. Seriously considering opposing arguments when confronted with them. 
2. Recognising and internalizing the import of opposing arguments when confronted with them. 
3. Showing genuine interest in opposing arguments or evidence.  
4. Questioning the perspectives, beliefs, and inferences one is personally invested in. 
5. Sympathetically and accurately paraphrasing opposing arguments in a genuine attempt to 
recognize their strengths and significance. 
6. Reasoning from within opposing perspectives in a genuine attempt to recognize their 
strengths and significance, as well as the limitations of one’s own perspective. 
7. Showing a genuine interest in basing one’s beliefs on the best available evidence.  
8. Showing a genuine interest in seeking opposing evidence. 
 
Weak sense critical thinking and non-critical thinking are the opposite of strong sense critical 
thinking and are displayed in behaviors such as these: 
 
1. Paying lip-service to the import of opposing arguments when confronted with them as a 
rhetorical device, or a prelude to counter-attack. 
2. Lack of interest in opposing arguments or evidence. Lack of inclination to investigate 
opposing arguments or evidence further. Passing the burden of proof to one’s opponents. 
Thinking that it is reasonable to keep one’s deeply held controversial belief until one’s 
opponents supply incontrovertible evidence or proof. 
3. Questioning only perspectives, beliefs, and inferences one is not personally invested in, or 
beliefs and inferences that are contrary or contradictory to those one is personally invested 
in. 
4. Application of the skills taught in the critical thinking course to arguments opposing one’s 
views more than to one’s own reasoning. 
5. Refusal to reason from within opposing perspectives. 
6. Criticising opposing evidence unfairly.  
7. Judging the quality of the evidence based on its agreement with one’s beliefs.  
8. Repeatedly and only defending one’s own beliefs and attacking the opposition. 
9. An admission that no arguments will ever be good enough to elicit change of belief. 
10. Shielding one’s beliefs from criticism by claiming that everyone has a right to their own 
beliefs.  
 
Although we don’t test for argument analysis and fallacy identification skills in this research, poor – 
and only poor – argument analysis and fallacy identification skills are relevant to scoring the third 
scale of the interview. The reason for this is our use of Richard Paul’s three-way distinction between 
strong sense critical thinking, weak sense critical thinking, and unskilled or non-critical thinking. Low 
dexterity with or use of argument analysis and fallacy identification skills counts against strong sense 
critical thinking because strong sense critical thinking is skilled thinking. But high dexterity with or 
correct and common use of argument analysis and fallacy identification skills does not count in 
favour of strong sense critical thinking because weak sense critical thinking can be just as skilled as 
strong sense critical thinking. It’s just that in weak sense critical thinking, skills are applied 
apologetically rather than fairmindedly. 
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TABLES 
 
Table 1 
Interview Inter-rater Reliability JK and IG 
  Q1IG Q2IG Q3IG 
Q1JK Pearson Correlation .826 .295 .317 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .026 .016 
Q2JK Pearson Correlation .354 .815 .101 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .007 .001 .455 
Q3JK Pearson Correlation .355 .362 .608 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .007 .006 .001 
 
Table 2 
Correlations between RPBS and SSCT (Interview Question Three) 
  Q3Mean Q3JK Q3IG 
Traditional Religious 
Belief 
Pearson Correlation -.320 -.255 -.339 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .015 .056 .010 
Psi Pearson Correlation -.217 -.163 -.244 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .105 .227 .067 
Witchcraft Pearson Correlation -.212 -.158 -.241 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .113 .241 .071 
Superstition Pearson Correlation -.200 -.204 -.145 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .135 .127 .283 
Spiritualism Pearson Correlation -.126 -.112 -.115 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .351 .405 .396 
Extraordinary Life Forms Pearson Correlation -.041 -.095 .050 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .761 .480 .713 
Precognition Pearson Correlation -.219 -.229 -.151 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .101 .087 .262 
Mean RPBS Pearson Correlation -.269 -.235 -.253 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .043 .078 .057 
High RPBS Pearson Correlation -.330 -.298 -.297 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .012 .024 .025 
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Table 3 
Correlations between CCTDI and SSCT (Interview Question Three) 
  Q3Mean Q3JK Q3IG 
Truth-seeking Pearson Correlation .279 .360 .091 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .035 .006 .500 
Open-mindedness Pearson Correlation .323 .288 .294 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .014 .030 .026 
Inquisitiveness Pearson Correlation .445 .501 .252 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .001 .059 
Analyticity Pearson Correlation .242 .284 .120 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .070 .032 .376 
Systematicity Pearson Correlation -.001 .058 -.088 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .997 .669 .517 
Confidence in 
Reasoning 
Pearson Correlation .155 .265 -.047 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .249 .046 .726 
Maturity of Judgment Pearson Correlation .150 .188 .056 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .266 .162 .678 
Total CCTDI Pearson Correlation .362 .446 .147 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .006 .001 .274 
Lowest CCTDI Pearson Correlation .237 .328 .043 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .076 .013 .749 
 
Table 4 
Correlations within Interview Items A 
  Q1JK Q2JK Q3JK Q1IG Q2IG Q3IG 
Q1JK Pearson Correlation 1 .220 .264 .826 .295 .317 
 Sig. (2-tailed)   .100 .047 .001 .026 .016 
Q2JK Pearson Correlation .220 1 .300 .354 .815 .101 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .100   .023 .007 .001 .455 
Q3JK Pearson Correlation .264 .300 1 .355 .362 .608 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .047 .023   .007 .006 .001 
Q1IG Pearson Correlation .826 .354 .355 1 .516 .384 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .007 .007   .001 .003 
Q2IG Pearson Correlation .295 .815 .362 .516 1 .153 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .026 .001 .006 .001   .256 
Q3IG Pearson Correlation .317 .101 .608 .384 .153 1 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .016 .455 .001 .003 .256   
Q1Mean Pearson Correlation .949 .305 .327 .962 .432 .369 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .021 .013 .001 .001 .005 
Q2Mean Pearson Correlation .271 .951 .348 .458 .954 .134 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .042 .001 .008 .001 .001 .321 
Q3Mean Pearson Correlation .316 .244 .935 .407 .308 .850 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .016 .067 .001 .002 .020 .001 
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Table 5 
Correlations within Interview Items B 
  Q1Mean Q2Mean Q3Mean 
Q1JK Pearson Correlation .949 .271 .316 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .042 .016 
Q2JK Pearson Correlation .305 .951 .244 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .021 .001 .067 
Q3JK Pearson Correlation .327 .348 .935 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .013 .008 .001 
Q1IG Pearson Correlation .962 .458 .407 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .001 .002 
Q2IG Pearson Correlation .432 .954 .308 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .001 .020 
Q3IG Pearson Correlation .369 .134 .850 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .005 .321 .001 
Q1Mean Pearson Correlation 1 .388 .382 
 Sig. (2-tailed)   .003 .003 
Q2Mean Pearson Correlation .388 1 .291 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .003   .028 
Q3Mean Pearson Correlation .382 .291 1 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .003 .028   
 
Table 6 
High RPBS, CCTDI, and Interview Means 
  Mean Std.  
Deviation 
High RPBS 4.65 1.93 
Truth-seeking 38.00 5.57 
Open-mindedness 43.82 5.74 
Inquisitiveness 49.05 5.49 
Analyticity 45.49 5.32 
Systematicity 39.84 5.87 
Confidence in 
Reasoning 
44.75 6.06 
Maturity of Judgment 45.70 6.05 
Q3JK 2.44 1.31 
Q3IG 1.63 .87 
Q3Mean 2.03 .98 
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Table 7 
Means for Interview Questions One and Two 
  Mean Std.  
Deviation 
Q1JK 5.81 .76 
Q2JK 4.79 .92 
Q1IG 5.84 .88 
Q2IG 4.91 .95 
Q1Mean 5.82 .78 
Q2Mean 4.85 .89 
 
Table 8 
Best Five Mean CCTDI with SSCT (Interview Question Three) Scores 
ID Mean CCTDI Q3JK Q3IG Q3Mean 
47 51.14 4 2 3 
33 50.57 4 3 3.5 
40 49.85 5 1 3 
1 49.42 2 1 1.5 
38 48.57 5 2 3.5 
 
Table 9 
Best Five High RPBS with SSCT (Interview Question Three) Scores 
ID High RPBS Q3JK Q3IG Q3Mean 
8 1 2 2 2 
27 1 5 2 3.5 
41 1 2 1 1.5 
47 1.25 4 2 3 
15 1.75 2 1 1.5 
 
